Alfaro and Henzinger use alternating simulation in a two player game as a renement for interface automata [1] . We show that interface automata correspond to a subset of modal transition systems of Larsen and Thomsen [2], on which alternating simulation coincides with modal renement. As a consequence a more expressive interface theory may be built, by a simple generalization from interface automata to modal automata. We dene modal I/O automata, an extension of interface automata with modality. Our interface theory that follows can express liveness properties, disallowing trivial implementations of interfaces, a problem that exists for theories build around simulation preorders. In order to further exemplify the usefulness of modal I/O automata, we construct a behavioral variability theory for product line development.
Introduction
An interface theory [1, 37] is a type-system-like theory for component languages, where types (interfaces) describe components (implementations) with composition being the only operator available. A type error proves that either a component does not conform to its interface, or that two composed components are incompatible. Since the overall structure of these type systems is so simple, it is often accepted not to give typing rules explicitly when describing interface theories (for example [1, 36] ), focusing instead on the essential ingredients of conformance, compatibility and composition.
Regular, non-component types are only applied to existing objects in program code. In contrast for interface theories it makes sense to discuss interfaces as specications of application's architecture in isolation from actual source code. An interface abstracts the component in terms of the assumptions made by the component and the guarantees that it provides. One reasons about possible connections between component implementations (compositions) by using properties of composition of interfaces; most importantly independent implementability (that any implementations conforming to compatible interfaces are compatible) and generality properties (that the composition of interfaces produces an interface with the weakest assumptions and strongest guarantees).
We consider behavioral interface theories suitable for specication of communication protocols between components (web services or embedded systems). Such theories typically require a contravariant treatment of inputs and outputs to ensure deadlock-free implementations: inputs guaranteed by the specication are always oered by the implementation and that the implementation never produces more outputs than the specication. This observation led de Alfaro, Henzinger and colleagues [1, 3, 4 ] to a conclusion that game theoretical models of interaction are most suitable as building blocks for behavioral interface theories. While we do appreciate the values of the game theoretical formulations, we disagree with some claims in the above cited work and argue that game formulations are insucient in themselves: there is a genuine value in combining the game theoretical approach with more traditional formulations based on transition systems, or more precisely on modal transition systems.
The two worlds of game models and modal transition systems convey largely orthogonal information about the moves of a system. Game models specify who has control over transitions, while modal transition systems focus on requirements, modality: which moves are allowed and which are required. In this paper we try to relate the two worlds, explain their weaknesses and their qualities. Eventually we combine them into a unied interface theory.
Game theoretical notions of conformance are often based on alternating simulation [8] . We show that alternating simulation in a two player setting, as used in interface automata [1, 9] , is just a special case of modal transition systems renement developed by Larsen and Thomsen [2] in the late eighties. This suggests that the real value of the game theoretic approach to component theories does not lie in the use of alternating simulation, but in the use of control information in the composition synthesis algorithms.
Not surprisingly then, modal transition systems themselves cannot be used to build an interface theory, without adding control information. We build a new interface theory around modal I/O automata, which combine features of both game theoretic models and modal transition systems. Thanks to this new combination, our interfaces are now able to express liveness properties, which was impossible in existing interface theories (after this work has been completed we have learned about [10] , which achieves a similar eect in a dierent setting).
In order to further demonstrate the usefulness of our modal I/O automata, we construct a product line [1113] theory. In simple words a product line is a set of similar products built by combining assets from a common platform available in the development process. The dierences between the products are referred to as variability. Our theory is a behavioral formalism for describing the variability of components. The theory supports deciding whether given requirements can be satised by choosing concrete instances from the set of available assets. This theory, though very small, is to the best of our knowledge one of the very few attempts at describing software product lines in a behavioral fashion, and unlike the previous work [14] , which takes a top-down approach to describing product families, it facilitates a bottom up construction of products, which is how product line development is more typically understood in the software engineering community. This contribution is not meant to be comprehensive, highly developed and well set in the tradition of the product line development. It should be understood as a simple example that emphasizes the semantic dierence between modeling components in component based development and modeling assets for product family development. We do hope to extend this theory soon and report about it separately in detail. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we shall explain the main results of the paper in nontechnical terms. Our main results concentrate in sections 3, 5 and 6. In Section 3 we draw a correspondence between the alternating simulation and observational modal renement. In Section 4 modal I/O automata are dened, which are then used to construct an interface theory in Section 5 and a product line theory in Section 6. Sections 5 and 6 are largely independent, though they share a lot of intuitions. We conclude in Section 7.
Interface Automata vs Modal Automata: An Example
Consider an example interface automaton for a Client component ( Fig. 1 (left) , originally presented in [1] ). This simple model describes a component that occasionally may want to send a package, and once it has made the request it is ready to receive an acknowledgment. The signature of the interface also mentions a fail input, but the component is never able to receive it. This means that Client is only capable of interacting with network links that never fail.
In interface automata, due to a game theoretic semantics, all outputs are controlled by the component itself (called the Output player), while all inputs to such components are controlled by the environment player (called the Input player). An implementation conforms to the interface i whenever some input is oered by the interface, then it is also oered by the implementation, and whenever an implementation produces any output, this output is also present in the interface (conformance formalized as alternating simulation [8] ).
Such a notion of conformance implies that compatibility can be passed from interfaces to components: if there is no winning strategy for the input player that leads to a deadlock in the interface automaton, then there won't be such a strategy for the same player that interacts directly with any implementation. Similarly if there is no strategy for the output player that leads to an output that cannot be accepted by the environment, then there is also no such strategy for any of the implementations. Unfortunately this notion of conformance, though very much safety oriented, does not enforce that the implementations take on any useful activities at all. Consider for example the diagram on the right side of Fig. 1 . It presents a model of an implementation that does not perform any actions ever. In other words this is a network application that does not use the network at all. Still this new model conforms to its interface on the left, as in its initial state it does not add any illegal outputs and it oers all the inputs that were oered by the interface.
If we turn this into the terminology used in modal transition systems it means that all the inputs are required, which is indicated by the 2 (must) modality on the corresponding transition, and the outputs are allowed, which is indicated by the 3 (may) modality on the transitions. In a modal transition systems perspective, conformance is based on modal renement [2] . This renement requires that whenever an implementation makes a step, then it must be possible to mimic it by an allowed transition of the specication; whenever the specication makes a required step it must be possible to match it with some required step of the corresponding state in the implementation. With the assignment of may to output transitions and must to input transitions this sounds nearly like the alternating simulation described above. In Section 3 we prove that indeed the two relations coincide if we require that the may transition relation is input-enabled.
Consequently modality gives strictly more modeling power than alternating renement. Various modalities can be assigned to actions regardless of whom controls them. Instead of allowing all possible extensions on inputs, as in interface automata, the designer is able to control what extensions are allowed. For example we can change the Client model of Fig. 1 to have a must modality (2) on the send! transition, which will have the eect that now all the implementations must be able to proceed producing an output. This would rule out trivial implementations as the one presented on the right side of Fig. 1 .
The game theoretic formulation of conformance gives a certain interpretation to inputs and outputs. Namely that inputs are incoming requests for service (for example remote procedure calls), while outputs are outgoing requests for 14 15 16 service (also remote procedure calls, albeit in the other direction). With such an interpretation it becomes clear that removing services from the promised list should be illegal, while removing calls to external services is perfectly ne. This is exactly what alternating simulation achieves. What it misses is a more complex structure of communication.
In asynchronous systems some messages indeed convey calls for service, however many other return feedback from the services (return a value). When a given output models returning a value from a component, then clearly it should never be removed, as then the whole component becomes useless. Fig. 2 illustrates another interface modeling a data link layer, which exploits the interplay between control and modality. The must modality is placed on transmt! transitions, as the data link layer would be useless if the implementation was permitted not to forward packets down the stack. Similarly the transition sending back the error message cannot legally be removed. At the same time the call for linkStatus! is a may transition as some implementations are allowed not to consult the hardware link explicitly to detect errors. Finally not all implementations are forced to be able to work with links that fail twice in a row, which is modeled by the second nack! transition being a may transition. Now consider how the two interfaces of Fig. 1 (left) and Fig. 2 (left) should be composed. The composition resembles a product computation (taken separately for the may transition relation and the must transition relation). As a result we obtain the interface presented on the right side of Fig. 2 . Because the client component was so weak, the ultimate interface shows a system that possibly may never do anything. However if Client will send some packets, these packets will certainly be processed by the composition, unless the hardware link is broken. In such a case it might be that the implementation will produce a fail! message which will cause a deadlock with the current version of the Client (this can happen when the composition is in state 22). Since we cannot modify the composed system we instead synthesize a new interface which restricts the use of the composition in order to guarantee error freeness. States of the composition that can experience deadlocks are called error states. We follow Alfaro and Henzinger in removing error states, and transitively all states from which error states can be reached by following internally controllable transitions of the component (outputs and internal actions). This leads to the interface on Fig. 3 (left), expressing the fact that this component works well as long as the physical link never goes down.
The pruning mechanism described above would not be possible without the information describing which transitions are internally controllable being explicitly present in the model. It does not seem possible to compute the safe fragment of the product automaton, by just investigating the modalities of transitions. While we have said that modal renement is strictly more expressive than alternating simulation, the control information of interface automata has its unique qualities too: it enables valuable synthesis algorithms not otherwise possible.
Let us now revisit the model of Fig. 2 (left) giving it a dierent interpretation than previously. Instead of perceiving it as an abstraction of a component, we should now see it as a description of a set of components. A modal automaton describes in fact a whole, often innite, set of possible implementation automata 3 . One can think of them as all possible congurations of the model. This feature of modal automata suggests the possibility of using them as a behavioral formalism in describing variability in product lines.
A product line is a collection of products that are similar in that they oer overlapping functionality, and in that they are built from assets selected from a common platform. In here we want to describe both assets and the whole product line by modal I/O automata. If each of the assets is modeled as a modal I/O automaton we can model the capabilities of the family by composing these descriptions. However this time we would not be interested in a composition that guarantees compatible behavior of any selection of assets. It is normally expected that not all the assets in a product line platform are mutually compatible. Some of them will deadlock (for example a failing link layer and our Client component). The requirement for composing the variability descriptions is not to synthesize an interface that guarantees correctness of composition of all possible combination of assets, but to precisely describes what the correct combinations are: i.e. what are the deadlock free behaviors respecting the modalities that can be constructed with the available automata.
It turns out that a composition like that exists and it resembles the pruning of the product automaton for interface automata. The only dierence is that now error states are the states where the error must be possible to realize (so one party must be required to produce an output that the other party must not be allowed to receive) and that we prune all the states from which reaching an error state is unavoidable (in our interface theory we have pruned states from which reaching errors might be possible).
The result of composing Client and LinkLayer using the variability model semantics is presented on the right side of Figure 3 . This result contains a slightly bigger model than the interface automaton composition on the left. It states that there exists a pair of assets (implementations of Client and LinkLayer ) such that it is able to accept a link down message without an error message. The transition with the down message was removed in the interface compositions as, for some pairs of implementations, it would lead to a deadlock.
Can a given specication be implemented by choosing components from available assets? Is the result of the composition the most general possible, containing all possible legal products? Can we nd what the conguration of these elements should be? We address some of these questions in section 6, with an intention of elaborating more in upcoming work.
Alternating Simulation vs Modal Renement
Let us begin with dening modal automata, a version of modal transition systems [2] extended with signatures. A modal automaton has two transition relations indicating respectively allowed (may) and required (must) behavior.
Denition 1 (Modal Automaton). A modal automaton S is a six tuple
where states S is a nite set of states, start S ∈ states S is the initial state, ext S and int S are disjoint sets of external and internal actions and act S = ext S ∪ int S , − → 3 S ⊆ states S × act S × states S is the may transition relation describing allowed behavior, and − → 2 S ⊆ states S × act S × states S is the must transition relation describing required behavior.
Throughout the paper we sometimes use the symbols !, ? and ; after an action. This is done in order to increase the readers intuition of whether the action is respectively an output, input or internal action. No symbol is used when the action can be of more than one type. These symbols could be left out completely as it is the identity of the action that is signicant.
In the following we write s τ − → * 2 s meaning that there exists a sequence of internal must actions leading from s to s . The same is dened for may transitions.
A modal automaton is syntactically consistent if everything that is required is also allowed, such that − → 2 ⊆ − → 3 . In the following we only consider syntactically consistent modal automata. A modal automaton is an implementation if the two transition relations coincide.
A modal automaton describes a set of possible implementations. Simplistically when rening a modal automaton specication into an implementation one can remove a may transition, that does not have a corresponding must transitions or strengthen it into a must transition. In general this renement is not syntactic, but behavioral, so it is not the syntactic transitions that are rened but the actual steps taken by the transition system. The same transition can be rened dierently each time it is taken.
Denition 2 (Modal Renement). For a pair of modal automata S and T
with the same signature, a binary relation R ⊆ states S × states T is a modal renement if whenever sRt and a ∈ act S it holds that
Modal renement ≤ m is dened as the largest such relation. We say that a modal automaton S modally renes a modal automaton T , written S ≤ m T , i there exists a modal renement containing (start S , start T ).
Observational modal renement is a weaker renement in which the two modal automata can take internal transitions, that cannot be directly observed by the other automaton. In absence of internal actions the observational renement coincides with the non-observational one. 
m is dened as the largest such relation. We say that a modal automaton S observationally renes a modal automaton T if there exists an observational modal renement containing (start S , start T ).
Interface Automata [1] can be considered a subset of modal automata in which the external actions ext S are partitioned into inputs in S and outputs out S . Denition 4 (Interface Automaton). An interface automaton P is a tuple P = (states P , start P , in P , int P , out P , − →P ) where states P is a nite set of states, start P ∈ states P is the initial state, in P , out P and int P are three pairwise disjoint sets of input, output and hidden (internal) actions respectively, and − →P ⊆ states P × act P × states P is the set of transitions where act P = in P ∪ out P ∪ int P .
We require that the transition relation is input-deterministic such that for all s, s , s ∈ states P and all input actions a ∈ in P if s a? − − → s and s a? − − → s then s = s .
Similarly as for Modal Automata we dene s τ − → * s for Interface Automata to mean that there exists a sequence of internal transitions leading from s to s . We dene alternating simulation for interface automata as commonly used in software specication [9] , which is slightly less general than the original [1]: Denition 5 (Alternating Simulation). For a pair of interface automata S and T with the same signature, a binary relation R ⊆ states S × states T is an alternating simulation if whenever sRt and a ∈ act S it holds that:
if
−→ s and a ∈ int S then ∃t .t τ − → * t and (s , t ) ∈ R Alternating simulation ≤ a is dened as the largest such relation. We say that S simulates T , written S ≤ a T , if there exists an alternating simulation containing (start S , start T ).
In order to compare interface automata with modal automata, we construct a translation function T mapping from the former to the latter. The result of the translation always fullls the conditions listed below. It is easy to see that for modal automata that fulll these conditions a reversed mapping can be constructed, too.
1. The may transition relation is input enabled, meaning that for each state s ∈ states S and each input action a ∈ in S there exists a state s and a may transition s a? −−→ 3 s 2. The constructed modal automaton is syntactically consistent: − → 2 ⊆ − → 3 3. Must transitions are only labeled by inputs:
Let s mayall be a fresh state that allows all behavior but does not require any behavior. If U denotes the universe of all inputs, such that for all interface automata P , in P ∈ U , then we dene the translation function as follows: for any two interface automata S, T :
Theorem 6 suggests that the usefulness of game theoretical models for component theories does not lie in its conformance relation. The crux is the use of control information in synthesis algorithms, when paths to error states are pruned. If this is the case we can construct an interface theory based on modal renement and modal automata augmented with control information. Since modal renement is richer and we can use a generalization of the synthesis algorithm used for interface automata, we will obtain a more expressive interface theory. The fact that alternating simulation coincides with the observational version of modal renement is expected, because Denition 5 embeds a closure on internal transitions. In fact in the absence of internal actions alternating simulation coincides with the regular modal renement, as described in Denition 2, which is easy to prove. In order to simplify the developments we use the regular modal renement (≤ m ) from now on, even though most of our theorems can reasonably be considered for the observational renement (≤ * m ), too.
Modal I/O Automata
Let us now dene modal I/O automata, an extension of modal automata with control information, that will be the main ingredients of our interface theory and the product line theory coming in the next sections. 
The transition relations are given by the following rules (see Fig. 2 for an example):
For technical reasons (eciency and simplicity) we always assume that unreachable states are removed after computing a composition (both here and in later sections). The following theorem is a simple corollary from the general fact that the modal renement is a precongruence [15, 16] : Theorem 8. Modal renement is a precongruence with respect to the above composition operator: for any four modal I/O automata T 1 ,
The composition operator (⊗) dened above corresponds to a usual composition of software (hardware) components. Whenever we use it below we mean an unrestricted connection of components, which does not preclude deadlocks or other kinds of errors. We shall soon introduce two seemingly similar composition operators, (|) and (·) having a very dierent use. In fact they are algorithms synthesizing specications of how a result of simple composition (⊗) should be used in order to guarantee the absence of certain errors.
A Modal Interface Theory
Interface theories support component based development. The aim is to specify component interfaces and from these interfaces to derive the interfaces of composite components. The novel aspect of the interface theory presented here is that the components can specify both required and allowed behavior, consequently it is suitable for expressing liveness properties.
In our specic interface theory an interface is given by a modal I/O automaton. A given interface species a set of potential implementations (concrete implementations have identical transition relations − → 3 = − → 2 ). The goal of our interface theory is to be able to use interface descriptions to describe legal implementations of components in a component based system. The implementation relation, the relation that species which implementations conform to a given interface description is modal renement ≤ m . From the interface descriptions of two components it should be possible to derive the interface of the combined component. This is done without knowing more about the implementations, than the fact that they conform to their individual interface specication.
The result of composing two interfaces is a subset of the result of composing two modal I/O automata, in which all possible internally controllable paths leading to error states are removed. An error state is a state in which one component can output something that the other component might be unable to receive:
State 22 on Fig. 2 is an error state, witnessed by the fail action.
We are now ready to dene the set of states of the composition:
where prune i (S) = {s ∈ S | ∀s ∀a ∈ int S 1 ⊗S 2 . s a − − → 3 s implies s ∈ S}, which is a monotonic function that removes, from the set of states S, all those states that in one internally controllable step may reach a state that is not in S.
See Figure 3 (left) for an example of how pruning works. State 22 has been removed as an error state, then state 21 was pruned as an error state can be reached from it by the internally controllable transition log!. Then all transitions involving states 21 and 22 were removed. State 20 remains in the result as the must transition labeled down is externally controllable. Denition 9 (Composition). The composition of two interfaces S 1 and S 2 is dened if S 1 and S 2 are composable modal I/O automata and start S 1 ⊗S 2 ∈ states S 1 |S 2 (see above). The composition results in a modal I/O automaton
Two interfaces are compatible if the set of states resulting from composition, states S 1 |S 2 , contains the initial state (start S 1 , start S 2 ). A desirable property of an interface theory is that components can be implemented independently of each other once the specications are known. The following theorem formally states that this theory satises the property.
Theorem 10 (Independent Implementability). For any two compatible interfaces S 1 , S 2 and for any two implementations I 1 ,
This has three implications. First, I 1 ⊗ I 2 would deliver all the required behavior promised by S 1 |S 2 as long as it interacts with an environment obeying S 1 |S 2 . Second, I 1 ⊗ I 2 will not do anything that S 1 |S 2 would not allow in such an environment. Third, since S 1 |S 2 does not contain error states then I 1 ⊗ I 2 will not deadlock.
Theorem 11 (Deadlock Freeness Preservation). For any two compatible
interfaces S 1 , S 2 , any two implementations I 1 , I 2 , so I 1 ≤ m S 1 and I 2 ≤ m S 2 , and any interface T compatible with S 1 |S 2 , if T ⊗ (S 1 |S 2 ) has no reachable error states then T ⊗ (I 1 ⊗ I 2 ) has no reachable error states.
Finally the composition operator (|) is commutative and associative up to graph isomorphism.
A Product Line Theory
In product line development one typically maintains a family of existing assets that are composed in a bottom-up fashion in order to build a product. Here we assume that existing assets are sucient to build the product and no genuinely new programming is required. Assets are organized in small subfamilies, that can be thought of as congurable components. Choosing an asset from a subfamily is a conguration process. We model subfamilies as modal I/O automata, and call them variability models, to distinguish them from interfaces. The conguration process amounts to nding a suitable modal renement of a variability model.
There is a need for a mechanism for composing variability models, to enable reasoning about the products that can be constructed using available assets. As in the interface theory we are interested in computing the legal uses for the composition of two models, without reaching error states. However we weaken the requirement this time: we do not require that all possible pairs of implementations give an error free composition, but only that there exists a pair of implementations that can avoid errors under a suitable use.
Two variability models are composable if their input, output and hidden actions do not overlap (the general rule for modal I/O automata). Two composable families can be composed, resulting in a description of a higher level component family. The signature of this variability model is found in the same way as for modal I/O automata. The requirement for the description of this more abstract family is that a specication that renes its description can be realized by choosing some concrete implementations from both lower level families involved. So that in eect one can congure the nal product by conguring the abstract composed variability model, being sure that the selected conguration can be rened to congurations of each of the smaller components, available in the collection of assets. We give a sucient condition for a renement of a variability model to be decomposable.
The ultimate composition closely resembles the composition (|) for interface automata: it uses the regular modal I/O automata composition (⊗) rst and then removes error states. However now only internally controllable required transitions are pruned, while in the interface theory we had also removed states reachable by allowed executions of the same kind. The very existence of allowed internally controlled execution to an error state was considered dangerous in the interface theoryit is not in the product line theory. This is because we are not interested in eliminating errors by all means, but only in making sure that there exist errorfree realizations of the specication. For two syntactically composable variability models we dene the set of error states, err v S 1 ,S 2 , to be:
In Figure 2 (right) state 22 is still an error state, though for a dierent reason than previously: in state 22 the LinkLayer must be able to produce fail, but the Client is not allowed to receive it. If a product of two variability models contains an error state it means that there exist congurations of composed assets that cannot safely work together. However, in the same spirit as in the interface theory, we can compute the set of legal uses that guarantee that there exist pairs of compatible congurations to interact with them. We remove from the product S 1 ⊗ S 2 all the states that according to the variability specication must be able to reach an error state. If there is no states left then the two variability models are incompatible. Otherwise we arrive at a specication of states and transitions among the compatible states that constraint possible legal implementations obtained from these two families. Formally:
where prune v (S) = {s ∈ S | ∀s . ∀a ∈ int S 1 ⊗S 2 ∪ out S 1 ⊗S 2 . s a − − → 2 s and s ∈ S}. We compute the two transition relations for the composition, by projecting the transition relations of the parallel composition S 1 ⊗ S 2 onto the new set of states:
Finally we can state the complete result of the composition: a modal I/O au-
and all the components are dened above.
Denition 12. Two variability models are compatible if they are composable and their composition is nonempty.
It turns out that observationally consistent renements of compositions of variability models are realizable with existing assets. We dene observational consistency for states of a single automaton. Let t A − − → 2 * t mean that t is reachable from t via a possible empty sequence of required transitions labeled by possibly dierent actions from a set A.
Denition 13. Let T be a modal automaton and let A ⊆ act T be a set of actions.
A relation C ⊆ states T × states T is an observational consistency relation with respect to A if for any pair of states (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ C the following two properties hold:
Two states are observationally consistent if there exists an observational consistency relation relating them. A set of states is said to be observationally consistent with respect to A if all possible pairs of states from the set are observationally consistent with respect to A. An automaton T is observationally consistent with respect to A i the set {start T } is an observationally consistent set.
The following theorem states the existence of decomposition formally:
Theorem 14 (Decomposability). Let T 1 , T 2 be deterministic composable variability models, and S be a conguration (a deterministic variability model itself ) such that S ≤ m T 1 · T 2 , and T 1 , S are observationally consistent with respect to act T 1 \ act T 2 and T 2 , S are observationally consistent with respect to act T 2 \ act T 1 . Then there exist S 1 and S 2 such that S 1 ≤ m T 1 and S 2 ≤ m T 2 and S 1 ⊗ S 2 ≤ m S.
A version of the theorem, not requiring observational consistency, does not hold, which can be demonstrated with a counter-example, not included here.
An important corollary is that the decomposition can be carried over down to precise congurations: if a concrete conguration of a product is required, then there exist concrete congurations of assets to realize it. The question whether a specication is realizable with given assets is reduced to establishing observational consistency and a modal renement between the postulated requirement and the variability model. Consequently the abstract variability model can be communicated to conguration engineers and used to congure nal products.
Let us close our discussion with a statement that the (·) operator is general enough to describe all implementations safely realizable with existing assets. Theorem 15 (Completeness). For any two compatible variability models T 1 , T 2 and any two compatible concrete implementation specications I 1 , I 2 , where I 1 ≤ m T 1 and I 2 ≤ m T 2 it holds that I 1 · I 2 ≤ m T 1 · T 2 .
Conclusion & Future Work
We have investigated the relation between alternating simulation as used in interface automata and observational modal renement, concluding that former is a case of the latter. We have argued that the strength of the game theoretic approach to interface theories does not lie in alternating renement itself, but in the labeling of transitions with control information; in partitioning the actions into internally and externally controllable. We have extended modal transition systems with this information and demonstrated that in this way interface theories tracking liveness properties, can be built. Finally we have presented a product line theory describing variability in behavior of component families.
In the future we would like to extend the product line theory of Section 6 to a full featured theory based on observational modal renement and study its properties in depth. Also it appears interesting to investigate the relation between the general notion of alternating renement [8] and (modal) transition systems, lifting the restrictions accepted in Section 3 after the interface automata model.
A Proofs
This appendix contains proofs of theorems and lemmas, along with some counterexamples for negative claims or one-way implications. The appendix is not an integral part of the paper, and reading it is not required in order to assess the value of the results.
A.1 Appendix for Section 3
This section uses formulations of Alternating Simulation and Observational Modal Renement with -closure(s) instead of s τ − → * .
Proof (of Theorem 6). The proof will be divided into two directions. First we will prove that ∀S, T ∈ IA. S ≤ a T =⇒ T (S) ≤ * m T (T ). We will prove this by showing that alternating simulation is a subset of observational modal renement on the translation of IA: ≤ a ⊆ ≤ * m . This will be shown by showing that the following relation is a modal renement.
This is shown in three dierent cases, one for each of the rules that dene observational modal renement.
1. Must transition, external action: Take t.t a − − → 2 t ∧ a ∈ ext T . We can conclude from the denition of translation that this case only exists for a ∈ in T . By R we have that ∃t.t a?
− − →t . From the denition of Alternating Simulation we have that ∃ŝ.ŝ a? − − →ŝ ∧ (s , t ) ∈ R. By translation we have that s a − − → 2 s and this implies that (s , t ) ∈ R.
2. May transition, external action: Take s.s a − − → 3 s ∧a ∈ out S ∪in S it means, by R, that ∃ŝ.ŝ a − →ŝ 2.1 a ∈ out S ∧ŝ a! −→ŝ , byŝ ≤ at and the denition of alternating simulation we have thatt a! −→t ∧ŝ ≤ at . By translation we have t a − − → 3 t this all implies that (s , t ) ∈ R.
a ∈ in S ∧ŝ a?
− − →ŝ ∧t a? − − →t , byŝ ≤ at , the denition of alternating simulation and the fact that IA are input deterministic we have thatŝ a? − − →ŝ ∧ŝ ≤ at and this implies that (s , t ) ∈ R. −→ŝ ∧ s = T (ŝ). By the denition of alternating simulation we have that ∃t .t τ − → * t ∧ŝ ≤ at . By translation we have that
. This all implies (s , t ) ∈ R.
We will now prove the other direction:
We will prove this by showing that observational modal renement, on the translation of IA, is a subset of alternating : ≤ * m ⊆ ≤ a . This will be shown by showing that the following relation is an alternating simulation.
This will be split into three cases, one for each of the rules in the denition of Alternating Simulation.
Taket a?
− − →t by Q and translation we have that a ∈ in T ∧ t a − − → 2 t . We have by s ≤ * m t and the denition of Observational Modal Renement that ∃s .s a − − → 2 s ∧ s ≤ m t and by translation we have thatŝ a − →ŝ where s = T (ŝ ) which implies that (ŝ ,t ) ∈ Q.
Takeŝ a!
−→ŝ , by Q and translation we have that a ∈ out S .s a − − → 3 s . We have by s ≤ * m t and the denition of Observational Modal Renement that ∃t .t τ − → * 3 t . ∃t . t a − − → 3 t and s ≤ * m t . By translation we have that this will give rise to a sequence of internal transitions followed by an a transition such that we know that ∃t .t τ − → * t .t a! −→t ∧ŝ ≤ at This all implies that (ŝ ,t ) ∈ Q.
Takeŝ a;
−→ŝ . By Q and by translation we have that a ∈ int S ∧ s a − − → 3 s We have by s ≤ * m t and the denition of Observational Modal Renement that ∃t .t τ − → * 3 t ∧ s ≤ * m t . By translation we know that this sequence of zero or more internal transitions will give rise to an identical sequence of internal transitions such that ∃t .t τ − → * t andŝ ≤ at . This all implies that (ŝ ,t ) ∈ Q A.2 Appendix for Section 4 Lemma 16. For any two composeable and syntactically consistent modal I/O automata S 1 , S 2 their parallel composition S 1 ⊗S 2 is also syntactically consistent.
A.3 Appendix for Section 5
Proof (of Theorem 10). This theorem is proven by showing that the relation R is a modal renement:
The proof is divided into two cases, one for each of the rules in the denition of modal renement.
1. s a − − → 2 s . This means that (s 1 , s 2 ) a − − → 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) . We want to show that ∃i .i a − − → 2 i ∧ (i , s ) ∈ R. This will be divided into ve sub cases depending on how (s 1 , s 2 ) a − − → 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) is achieved. Several of these cases are symmetric versions of each other.
−−→ 2 s 2 must exists, else the output transition would have been pruned. We know
−−→ 2 i 2 . So take i = (i 1 , i 2 ), by denition of I 1 ⊗ I 2 we have that i a − − → 2 i and this implies that (i , s ) ∈ R. 1.2 This case is completely symmetric, where it is s 2 that outputs.
Also in this case we have, by composability, that
This case is symmetric with the previous case.
This case is symmetric with the previous case. All three cases also have symmetric cases where the transition in question is part of
This will be divided into ve sub cases depending on how (i 1 , i 2 ) a − − → 3 (i 1 , i 2 ) is achieved. Several of these cases are symmetric versions of each other. 
This case is symmetric with the previous case. All three cases also have symmetric cases where the transition in question is part of I 2 .
Proof (of Theorem 11).
The proof proceeds as a contrapositive proof in which we show that if an error state was reachable in T ⊗ (I 1 ⊗ I 2 ) then an error state would also be reachable in T ⊗ (S 1 |S 2 ). There are two ways in which an error state could be reachable in T ⊗ (I 1 ⊗ I 2 ).
err i
T,(I 1 ⊗I 2 ) ∩ reachable(T ⊗ (I 1 ⊗ I 2 ))is non empty.
2. Π 2 (reachable(T ⊗ (I 1 ⊗ I 2 ))) ∩ err i I 1 ,I 2 is non empty.
Contrapositive proof:
1. Assume that (t, i) ∈ err i T,(I 1 ⊗I 2 ) and that (t, i) is reachable. No we want to show that ∃(t, s) ∈ err i T,(S 1 |S 2 ) and that (t, s) is reachable. Because t is reachable and I 1 ⊗ I 2 ≤ m S 1 |S 2 (Theorem 10) we know that ∃s ∈ states S 1 |S 2 and i ≤ m s ∧ s is reachable by may transitions in S 1 |S 2 .
We now need to argue that (t, s) is reachable by may transitions. This follows from I 1 ⊗ I 2 ≤ m S 1 |S 2 (Theorem 10). Because of consistency we only consider may transitions. Executions of T and I 1 ⊗I 2 is a sequence of may transitions of T and I 1 ⊗I 2 . All the may transitions of I 1 ⊗ I 2 can be matched by may transitions of
. The argument is identical to the previous case.
Assume that
−−→ 2 . So we can conclude that an error state would be reachable in T ⊗ (S 1 |S 2 ) in this case.
Lemma 17. For any two composeable and syntactically consistent modal interface automata S 1 , S 2 their parallel composition S 1 |S 2 is also syntactically consistent.
Theorem 18 (Associativity).
A.4 Appendix for Section 6
Lemma 19. For any two composeable and syntactically consistent modal variability models S 1 , S 2 their parallel composition S 1 · S 2 is also syntactically consistent.
Denition 20 (A-closure). For a set of actions A we dene an A-closure of a pair of states (s, t 1 ) ∈ states S × states T 1 as a subset Σ of states S × states T 1 consisting of (s, t 1 ) itself and all pairs (s , t 1 ) in which s can be reached from s by following a sequence of steps from − → 2 S labeled solely by actions in A and t 1 can be reached from t 1 by following an identical sequence (sequence with the same labels) of steps from − → 2 T 1 . Closures for pairs of states of S and T 2 are dened analogously.
Denition 21 (A-closure). We lift denition 20 to sets of pairs of states, such that the result is simply the union of the A-closures of all pairs. Let t A − − → 2 * t mean that t is reachable from t via a possible empty sequence of required transitions labeled by actions from a set A (possibly dierent actions).
We will dene observational consistency for states of a single automata.
Denition 22. Let T be a modal automaton and let A ⊆ act T be a set of actions.
Lemma 23. Consistency is transitive in the following sense: for a consistency
Lemma 24. Let S, T 1 , T 2 be modal I/O automata and S ≤ m T 1 · T 2 . If s ∈ states S and t 2 ∈ states T 2 are observationally consistent states wrt to act T 2 \ act T 1 then projections of (act T 2 \act T 1 )closure(s, t 2 ) on the rst and second 4 component give observationally consistent sets of states with respect to the same set of actions act T 2 \ act T 1 .
Similarly if s ∈ states S and t 1 ∈ states T 1 are observationally consistent states wrt to act T 1 \ act T 2 then projections of (act T 1 \act T 2 )closure(s, t 1 ) on the rst and second component give observationally consistent sets of states with respect to the same set of actions act T 1 \ act T 2 .
These claims generalize also to sets of consistent states.
Proof (of Thm. 14). We shall construct S 1 and S 2 exhibiting the requirements of the theorem. The signatures of S 1 and S 2 are identical to those of T 1 and T 2 :
Since S ≤ m T 1 · T 2 there exists the least relation R ⊆ states S × (states T 1 × states T 2 ), which is a modal renement of T 1 · T 2 by S. Let (10) and
We create only one transition relation for each of S 1 and S 2 (or more precisely both will have two, but identical transition relations). Intuitively this transition relation for S 1 will contain all steps allowed by T 1 and required by S. Formally it is given by the following rules:
We take the must transition relation − → 2 S 1 to be identical with − → 3 S 1 . Note that eectively S 1 follows all must transition relations of S in its sort, except that whenever T 1 requires an input that is not followed by S (as T 2 is not able to synchronize on this input), we redirect the transition relation to a region where all must transitions of T 1 are mapped. We do that as minimum addition to maintain renement of T 1 by S 1 , on the functionality not explored by S.
We refrain from showing the rules for S 2 herethey can be easily constructed by analogy, as the problem is entirely symmetric.
It is clear that the constructed systems S 1 and S 2 are deterministicthe closure operation is deterministic and we apply to a unique maximal set for each action in each particular source state.
Lemma 25. The rules for transitions of S 1 ensures that if the originating state belongs to states S 1 then the target state will also belong to states S 1 .
An entirely symmetric lemma can be made for S 2 .
Proof. (Lemma 25) First we need to argue that the initial state start S 1 ∈ states S 1 . Firstly start T 1 ∈ states T 1 which satises the rst part of the requirement for states in states S 1 . Now we need to show that (act T 2 \ act T 1 )closure(start S , start T 2 ) ⊆ {(s, t 2 ) | (s, (t 1 , t 2 )) ∈ R}. The state from which the closure is calculated namely, ({(start S , start T 2 )}, start T 1 ), is part of states S 1 because (start S 1 , (start T 1 , start T 2 )) ∈ R. All the transitions that are taken in the calculation of the closure are on actions not involving T 1 and are taken simultaneously by S and T 2 , which ensures that all pairs of states Σ 1 that are reached will still fulll the requirement for being in states S 1 .
The rest of the proof consists of four cases, one for each rule. We need to argue for transitions generated by each of the four rules that the target state will be in states S 1 , given that the source state is. Transitions generated by rule (13) ensure this because the states that are in Σ 1 have taken one transition that is on a non shared action of T 1 . This transition is taken simultaneously by T 1 and S. Finally the closure also preserves the property, by the same argument as before. The argument for rule (14) is similar, the only dierence being that the rst transition is on a shared action and is taken by S, T 1 and T 2 . Rule (15) and (16) are dierent. Here the argument is that ∅ is a subset of {(s, t 2 ) | (s, (t 1 , t 2 )) ∈ R}.
We want to show that
is a modal renement of T 1 by S 1 .
Consider an arbitrary pair of states ((Σ 1 , t 1 ), t 1 ) ∈ R 1 and a transition t 1 a − − → 2 T 1 t 1 . We want to show that there exists a state (Σ 1 , t 1 ) and a transition such that (Σ 1 , t 1 ) a − − → 2 S 1 (Σ 1 , t 1 ) and ((Σ 1 , t 1 ), t 1 ) ∈ R 1 1.1 • If Σ 1 = ∅ then take Σ 1 to be ∅ and the corresponding transition exists due to rule (16) or rule (15) . In the case of rule (15) the premise that ∀(s, t 2 ) ∈ Σ 1 is trivially true. 1.2 • Let a be an action of T 1 that is not shared with T 2 , or similarly a ∈ act S 1 \ act S 2 . We want to apply rule (13) and want to show that the premises are fullled. The rst two premises are fullled by the case that we are looking at. The third premise is fullled by the following argument. Because t 1 is making a step we have that (t 1 ,
. By the denition of states S 1 and R 1 we have that (s, (t 1 , t 2 )) ∈ R for every pair (s, t 1 ) ∈ Σ 1 . Because R is a modal renement of T by S we have that s a − − → 2 S s and (s , (t 1 , t 2 )) ∈ R for every pair (s, t 1 ) ∈ Σ 1 . The third premise will trivially hold and we can even conclude that Σ 1 will be nonempty. Now we can apply rule (13) and we can conclude that indeed (Σ 1 , t 1 ) a − − → 3 S 1 (((act T 2 \act T 1 )closure(Σ 1 ), t 1 ). From this we can conclude that a similar must transition exists because the two transition relations are identical. Finally we can conclude that (((act T 2 \act T 1 )closure(Σ 1 ), t 1 ) ∈ R 1 because the generated transitions stay within states S 1 and t 1 ∈ states T 1 .
1.3 • Let a be an action of T 1 that is shared with T 2 , or similarly a ∈ act S 1 ∩act S 2 .
We want to apply rule (14) and (15), in two dierent sub cases, and want to show that the premises are fullled. The rst two premises of both rules are fullled by the case that we are looking at. The third premise of rule (14) and (15) are each others opposites, such that the one is true when the other is false and vise versa. Looking at the case where ∃(s, t 2 ) ∈ Σ 1 .s a − − → 2 S , which is exactly the third premise of rule (14) , then we can conclude that the last premise for rule (14) is true by the following argument. Because S is consistent we know that there is a transition s a − − → 3 S . Because R is a modal renement of T by S and we can conclude that the only way that this transition can exist is if a similar transition t 2 a − − → 3 T 2 t 2 exists such that (t 1 , t 2 ) a − − → 3 T 1 ·T 2 . The fourth premise of rule (14) is trivially true, but we can now conclude that Σ 1 is nonempty. Now we can apply rule (14) and we can conclude that indeed (Σ 1 , t 1 ) a − − → 3 S 1 (((act T 2 \act T 1 )closure(Σ 1 ), t 1 ). From this we can conclude that a similar must transition exists because the two transition relations are identical. Finally we can conclude that (((act T 2 \ act T 1 )closure(Σ 1 ), t 1 ) ∈ R 1 because the generated transitions stay within states S 1 and t 1 ∈ states T 1 . Now turning to the other sub case where ∀(s, t 2 ) ∈ Σ 1 s a − − → 2 S . In this case there are no must transitions in S requiring the behavior but S 1 will have the behavior because T 1 requires it. From this we can conclude that (∅, t 1 ) a − − → 3 S 1 (∅, t 1 ) and that a similar must transition exists because the two transition relations are identical. Finally we can conclude that (((act T 2 \act T 1 )closure(∅), t 1 ) ∈ R 1 because the generated transitions stay within states S 1 and t 1 ∈ states T 1 .
This nishes one direction of the proof. Lets now consider a may transition (Σ 1 , t 1 ) a − − → 3 S 1 (Σ 1 , t 1 ). We need to show that a transition t 1 a − − → 3 T 1 t 1 exists such that ((Σ 1 , t 1 ) ∈ R 1 ) 1.4 • This transition could have been generated by one of the four rules (13)- (16) . In two of the cases we can directly conclude that a transition t 1 a − − → 3 T 1 t 1 exists. In the other two cases we can conclude that this transition exists because the rules require a similar must transition and T 1 is syntacticly consistent. Now it follows directly from Lemma 25 that (Σ 1 , t 1 ) ∈ R 1 2 • The proof that S 2 ≤ m T 2 is entirely symmetric to the proof that S 1 ≤ m T 1 .
3 • Show that S 1 ⊗ S 2 ≤ m S. We do that by arguing that R 2 = {(((Σ 1 , t 1 ), (Σ 2 , t 2 )), s) | ((act T 1 \act T 2 )closure(s, t 1 ) ⊆ Σ 2 and ((act T 2 \act T 1 )closure(s, t 2 ) ⊆ Σ 1 and Π 1 (Σ 1 ) is observationally consistent wrt act T 2 \act T 1 and Π 1 (Σ 2 ) is observationally consistent wrt act T 1 \act T 2 } (18)
is a modal renement of S by S 1 ⊗ S 2 . First we should argue that
Obviously (act T 2 \act T 1 )closure(start S , start T 2 ) ⊆ Σ 0 1 and (20) (act T 1 \act T 2 )closure(start S , start T 1 ) ⊆ Σ 0 2 (21) (actually equalities hold). Observational consistency of projections of Σ 0 1 and Σ 0 2 follows from consistency of S, T 1 , T 2 and Lemma 24. We shall discuss that the may transition relation preserves the renement. Take any (((Σ 1 , t 1 ), (Σ 2 , t 2 )), s) ∈ R 2 and a transition step
We want to nd a state s such that s a − − → 3 S s and ((Σ 1 , t 1 ), (Σ 2 , t 2 )), s ) ∈ R 2 . Note that due to the way R 2 is constructed we know that neither Σ 1 nor Σ 2 are empty. The transition step of the composition must then be created by both components taking a shared action (and both following rule (14) ) or by one component taking a non-shared action, by rule (13) , and the other not changing state. Observe that rule (16) , can never give rise to such a transition as it would require Σ 1 or Σ 2 to be empty, which we have just ruled out. 3.1 • Let a ∈ act S 1 ∩ act S 2 . We want to rst argue that both components take steps generated by rule (14) and not rule (15) . The latter would require that either t 1 or t 2 enjoys a must transition t i a − − → 2 T i t i . If both transitions existed, they would imply that also s a − − → 2 S s (since (s, (t 1 , t 2 )) ∈ R, S is deterministic), which would contradict the joint premises of the rules. So only one of the two must transitions can exist. But then the other component is taking a transition generated by rule (14) implying that s a − − → 2 S s , contradicting premises of rule (15) (for both components). In other words rule (15) could not have been used, so for some sets Σ 1 , Σ 2 :
